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 The streets of Tehran filled with protesters on June 13 as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was announced the winner of the Iranian presidential election. The world witnessed tens of thousands of protesters fighting against members of local militias in support of Ahmadinejad’s opponent, Mirhossein Mousavi, in the weeks that followed. The death of protester Neda Agha-Soltan in the first round of protests struck a particularly somber tone for observers rooting for Ahmadinejad’s ouster. Iran’s modern political history made these demonstrations seem merely a part of a tragic mosaic instead of a grassroots uprising capable of creating a new government.
The end of World War II marked the end of foreign rule over Iran in earnest. Iran allied with the Soviet Union and pushed against British influence over regional oil fields in the years that followed the war. The Iranian people saw promise from civilian leaders like Muhammad Musaddiq, who tried to substitute pre-war monarchical rule with democracy and civil liberties. Musaddiq’s overthrow by the Iranian army and the CIA on August 19, 1953, ushered in the rule of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavai, until the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Oscillating political momentum between moderates like Muhammad Khatami (1997–2005) and hard-liners like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has marked modern Iran.
Iranian Politics
The pendulum seemed to swing toward moderate candidate Mousavi as the June 12 presidential election approached. Ahmadinejad’s popularity was waning in recent months due to plummeting oil prices, which contributed to increased joblessness and poverty. Formerly a prime minister in the 1980s, Mousavi emerged as a leading opponent based on his moderate platform advocating greater social freedoms and economic privatization. Mousavi’s political assets made the announcement on the day after the election that President Ahmadinejad won a second term with 63 percent of the vote, surprising hopeful observers around the world.
Iranian voters followed the lead of Mousavi, who stated that the election was a charade, by hitting the streets of Tehran in the days following the election. The protests in Tehran, Tabriz, Zahedan, and other Iranian cities pitted thousands of protesters against well-armed militias under government control. Additional protests took place in Orumiyeh, Zanjan, and Mashhad in response to the Guardian Council’s commitment to a partial recount instead of holding another election. The death toll from these protests has fluctuated from a handful, according to Iranian state media, to 300, according to the Iranian Students Solidarity Movement.
The Guardian Council determined on June 29 that the balloting for president was conducted fairly after a recount of 10 percent of the votes. Western observers and Iranian protesters disagreed with this assessment and deemed it self-serving given the central government’s control over the Guardian Council. Silent vigils throughout Iran, stronger demonstrations in July, and the potential for further flare-ups in the future followed the initial round of protests. The government’s response has been to send out riot police and organize counter-demonstrators to win the battle for law and order. The government of Ali Khameini has kept a tight lid on media coverage of the protests by arresting reporters and filtering social networking platforms, like Facebook.
Global Response to Iran’s Election Crisis
The Iranian election story dealt as much with the Obama administration’s response as it did with Iranian internal affairs among American media outlets. President Obama did not come out strongly against the Iranian government for cracking down on protesters until well after the election. “I do think that the Obama administration’s initial response to the crackdown on demonstrators was not strong enough,” states Professor Steven Redd, associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. Redd speculates that the Obama administration held back on heavy criticism of Ahmadinejad and the violent response to protests because “[the president] is concerned with perhaps having to deal with Ahmadinejad should the protests fail.” The president should have crafted “a response more along the lines of President John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and others in their day to the various actions of the Soviet Union,” according to Professor Redd.
Shale Horowitz, an associate professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, notes the predictability of the global response. “The global response isn’t really that important because what is really important is what is happening in Iran,” explains Horowitz.
Predicting the Future of Iranian Politics
The Khameini government’s re-election of Ahmadinejad still leaves Iran’s domestic and foreign policies on the edge. Ahmadinejad’s reputation as a world leader has been rife with controversy amid his frequent calls to wipe Israel off the map, his dalliances with nuclear weapons, and his well-publicized comments about homosexuality during a trip to New York City in 2008. President Obama and fellow world leaders renewed pressure on Iran to shut down its nuclear reactors with a September 2009 deadline set at July’s G8 conference in Italy. Given the array of questions around Ahmadinejad’s legitimacy, it remains uncertain how the election crisis influences Iran’s role in the world.
“I don’t put too much stock in the confirmation by the Guardian Council of Ahmadinejad’s election, and I would guess that most others around the world don’t either,” Professor Redd notes. Redd bases his analysis on the general consensus of the election being rigged. Ahmadinejad’s diminished reputation among global leaders based on past actions casts doubt on his ability to work constructively with other nations, according to Redd.
Professor Horowitz is skeptical about the influence of mass demonstrations on the current power structure in Iran. “Usually, for this type of mass demonstration to challenge the state, you need some element of the existing regime to challenge other elements,” notes Horowitz. Despite a lack of outpouring of public support from clerics for Ahmadinejad, Horowitz says, “it is not impossible, but it is much less likely” that the protesters will exert influence over the Iranian government. Horowitz concedes that although “the regime is certainly weakened” by the election crisis, “these regimes can cling to power for a long time if they are brutal and efficient enough.” ¶
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